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 Abstract 
This paper is concerned essentially with the question, how does financial 
globalisation affect welfare?  Orthodox theory suggests that because of greater 
risk-sharing between countries that financial liberalisation entails, there should 
be no welfare losses.  Greater risk sharing should lead to greater smoothing of 
consumption and/or growth trajectories for developing countries. Yet there is 
widespread evidence of crises following liberalisation.  Apart from these 
international macro-economic issues, it is argued here that financial 
globalization changes the very nature of capitalism from managerial to finance 
capitalism.  This profoundly affects at the micro-economic level corporate 
governance, corporate finance and income distribution. Both macro- and micro-
economic factors outlined here influence human development. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This paper is concerned with the complex and controversial subject of financial 
globalisation.  This is a large topic which raises important theoretical, empirical 
and policy issues outlined in this introduction.  A few of these will be examined 
in detail in the main body of the paper. 
 
One of my remits for this paper is to examine also the relationship between 
financial globalisation and human development.  This is a subject on which 
there is very little direct empirical information available.  One is therefore 
obliged to use more a priori reasoning as well as surrogates for the relevant 
empirical variables in arriving at reasonable conclusions.  This part of the paper 
therefore does not get as much space as the discussion on financial globalisation 
in emerging and developing countries.  Indeed if there had been no injunction to 
study the impact of financial globalisation on human development, an 
appropriate title for the paper would have been “financial globalisation and 
emerging countries”. 
 
We shall start the discussion of financial globalisation with the simplest 
question: What constitutes this phenomenon?  What is its nature and extent in 
developing countries?  A slightly less simple question is ‘How does financial 
liberalisation differ from trade liberalisation’.  Does trade liberalisation for 
instance lead to greater global welfare than financial liberalisation, other things 
being equal? 
 
More complex issues pertain to the political economy of financial 
liberalisation1.  Has the latter been encouraged by the international financial 
institutions to promote global efficiency and welfare? or is it simply a device 
whereby the US Treasury and Wall Street seek to control economic destinies of 
developing countries, as some scholars allege.  
Financial liberalisation can affect human development through a number of 
fairly obvious channels: 
 
a. Its influence on economic growth 
b. On economic fluctuations 
c. Distribution of income. 
 
What light does economic analysis and empirical evidence such as is it, shed on 
these issues? 
 
There are also other important issues which deserve attention in a fuller analysis 
of financial globalisation.  One significant question in this context is whether 
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financial globalisation makes it easier or more difficult to achieve balance of 
payments equilibria between countries while ensuring full employment in all 
countries?  A corollary of the above question is whether financial globalisation 
is in general more efficient at resolving financial imbalances between countries? 
The motivation for the above question comes from Keynes’s famous 
observation: 
 
“The problem of maintaining equilibrium in the balance of payments 
between countries has never been solved….the failure to solve this 
problem has been a major cause of impoverishment and social discontent 
and even wars and revolutions…to suppose that there exists some 
smoothly functioning automatic mechanism of adjustment which 
preserves equilibrium if only we trust to matters of laissez faire is a  
doctrinaire delusion which disregards the lessons of historical experience 
without having behind it the support of sound theory.” (Keynes 1980, 
pages 21-22) 
 
It will be appreciated that many of the above issues can be subsumed under an 
overarching question: What is the effect on economic welfare of the free 
movement of capital between countries?  On this issue, textbooks economics 
suggests a huge disconnect between orthodox economic theory and the 
empirical evidence.  Orthodox theory suggests that because of greater risk 
sharing between countries, which financial liberalisation leads to, there should 
be no ill effects of liberalisation on the welfare of participating countries.  
Greater risk sharing should lead to greater smoothing of consumption and/or 
growth trajectories for developing countries.  It will be easier to absorb ceteris 
paribus a negative shock to the world’s economy which is organised for 
instance in larger regional groups of countries than in smaller groups.  Yet the 
empirical evidence over the last three decades suggests frequent crises and 
sharp falls in welfare as a result of specific measures of financial liberalisation 
adopted by individual countries. 
 
Apart from these international macro-economic issues, it will be argued here 
that financial globalization has pervasive effects on the economy and the society 
at the micro-economic as well as the mesa-economic levels.  Indeed it changes 
the nature of capitalism from managerial to finance capitalism.  The highly 
active role of the stock markets, the greater power of shareholders, the influence 
of institutional investors and ultimately the institutional device of hostile 
takeovers characterise capitalism under financial globalisation.  At the 
microeconomic level these dimensions of financial globalisation have a 




This paper will provide analysis and evidence on many of the above questions 
and, as noted earlier, also discuss policy implications for human development.  
In the international macro-economic discussion of the various aspects of 
financial globalization special attention will be given to the 2008-2010 global 
economic crisis.  A significant part of the literature tends to blame the recent 
economic and financial crisis on financial globalization.  The present paper 
contributes by departing from this view and suggesting that financial 
liberalisation has positive as well as negative effects on the world economy, 
both of which should be taken into account in arriving at a balanced picture of 
the phenomenon.  The policy challenge lies in creating institutional frameworks 
which can harness the positive features of this inherently powerful 
phenomenon.  It will be argued here that in principle, under the right conditions 
financial globalisation can induce faster economic growth, reducing world 
poverty and promoting sustainable human development.  The latter positive 
effects of financial globalization tend to be ignored in much of the literature 
which thereby provides an unbalanced view of the effects of financial 
globalization.  The paper also makes a contribution by its explicit analysis of the 
micro-economic and mesa- economic aspects of financial globalisation which 
are often neglected in many analyses of the subject. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section two discusses the issue of subprime 
mortgages which are generally thought to have been the triggers for the crisis.  
Section three attempts to answer the simple questions about the nature and 
extent of financial globalization in rich and poor countries.  Section four 
examines the orthodox case for financial globalisation in the form of complete 
capital account liberalisation in all countries.  This case has been championed 
by the IMF and by Larry Summers the former US treasury secretary as well as 
by other high US officials.  This section also discusses the analytical case 
against the IMF- Summers view that unfettered capital movements are essential 
for maximising world welfare.  Section five examines the relationship between 
financial globalization and the performance of the real world economy between 
2000 and 2007 and suggests that there is an important positive relationship 
between the two variables.  Section six reviews international evidence on the 
effects of financial globalization at the micro-economic and mesa-economic 
levels.  Special attention is given to countries which have coordinated 
capitalism, such as Japan, Germany and France and to the two countries of free 
market capitalism, the UK and the US.  The implications of the analysis for 
emerging countries are spelt out.  Section seven considers the new IMF doctrine 
on capital flows and capital controls. Section eight sums up the effects of 
financial globalization on human development and includes the issue of income 




2 FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION AND THE CURRENT CRISIS 
 
Contrary to the statement of the benefits of financial liberalisation due to risk 
sharing and consumption smoothing, it is highly significant the recent global 
crisis provides almost experimental evidence on how aspects of such 
globalisation can adversely affect economic welfare. There is a general 
consensus among students of the subject that the trigger for the global economic 
crisis of 2008-2010 (the great recession) was provided by the difficulties of the 
US housing sector – the so-called subprime mortgages market2.  Blanchard 
(2008, 2009) has done important research on this subject.  He notes that by 
October 2007 the estimated loss on US subprime loans and securities was of the 
order of $250 billion.  However, the decline in stock markets values, measured 
as the sum of all markets of the fall in stock market capitalisation from July 
2007 to November 2008 was estimated to equal about $26,400 billion. This is a 
hundred times the initial loss caused by subprime mortgages. Blanchard 
provides another statistic which is equally interesting. He estimates, under 
plausible assumptions, the expected cumulative loss in world output associated 
with the global crisis based on current forecasts.  This loss is constructed as a 
sum over all countries, of the expected cumulative deviation of output from 
trend in each country, based on IMF estimates and forecasts of output as made 
in November 2008, for the years 2008 to 2015.  Based on these estimates the 
cumulative loss is forecast to run at $4,700 billion.  This is about twenty times 
the initial subprime loss.  
 
The question is, how could such a relatively limited and localised event have 
effects of such magnitude on the world economy?  This was not after all the 
first time in US economic history that there had been a bursting of the housing 
bubble.  This did not invariably lead to a depression in the US economy, let 
alone in the whole world. Robert Solow (2009) noted that the combined result 
of the housing and the stock market shocks was a fall in US household wealth 
from US$ 64.4 trillion in mid-2007 (before the crisis) to US$ 51.5 trillion at the 
end of 2008.  Thus 13 trillion dollars of household wealth disappeared in the 
space of about one year. As Solow (2009) rightly observes:  
“Nothing concrete had changed.  Buildings still stood; factories were still 
capable of functioning; people had not lost their ability to work or their 
skills or their knowledge of technology.  But a population that thought in 
2007 that they had 64.4 trillion dollars with which to plan their lives 
discovered in 2008 that they have lost 20 per cent of that.” 
The spread of the decline in stock market prices from the US to the rest of the 
world, it will be argued, was entirely due to “financial globalisation” in the 
previous two decades when the world’s financial markets began a process of 
integration as a result of extensive de-regulation 3 of the operations of the 
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financial institutions.  The reasons for this institutional change will be explained 
in the next section.  
 
This episode reveals that contrary to neoclassical analysis of risk sharing which 
may be expected from greater financial integration, this apparently did not 
happen or its influence was overwhelmed by other factors.  Indeed, the opposite 
appears to have occurred with financial globalisation leading to a fall in asset 
prices all over the world.  Such a contagion effect may in certain circumstances 
be far more powerful than the risk sharing aspect.  In the following sections we 
will examine the case of financial globalisation taken as a whole in all its 
various aspects and consider its impact on the global real economy.  We will 
find that contrary to the subprime mortgages case the overall impact of the 
financial liberalisation on globalisation was probably positive. 
3 THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION  
 
Financial globalisation has come to dominate the world economy over the last 
two to three decades.  In its present form it started with the demise of the 
Bretton Woods system in the early 70’s and the floating of the US dollar.  It 
took a big step forward with the restitution of the convertibility of pound 
sterling by Mrs Thatcher in the UK in 1979.  Similar liberalisation measures 
were emulated by other advanced countries.  It is important to remember that 
liberalisation and globalisation tend to be additive cumulative processes.  
Financial liberalisation occurs at different speeds in different countries during 
various periods. 
 
Broadly speaking industrial countries have been operating under a regime of 
financial liberalisation since the mid- 1980s and many developing countries 
since the mid-1990s (see further Arestis and Singh 2010; Singh forthcoming).  
An important part of the financial liberalisation process has been the fast 
development of stock markets around the world particularly in emerging 
countries.  The IMF and World Bank have for a long time been advocating 
another aspect of financial liberalisation, namely capital account liberalisation 
to all countries including developing ones.  In the mid-1990s the IMF proposed 
that its articles of agreement should be changed to make capital account 
liberalisation one of the main duties of the organisation.  However this proposal 
was later abandoned in view of the Asian financial crisis.  
 
Apart from the IMF and the World Bank the movement towards liberalisation of 
internal and external markets has been strongly supported by financial interests, 
banks, insurance companies in the US and also in other advanced countries.  
One of the major triumphs of globalisation was the repeal in 1999 of the US 
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Glass-Steagall Act which had limited the size and scope of the financial 
institutions.   
 
It was, however, not just the financial lobbies’ pressure which led to 
liberalisation of global finance.  There was strong ideological conviction at the 
highest levels of US government that financial innovation is good for the 
economy and the best way to promote it is to regulate it lightly, if at all.  This 
was the view strongly held by Alan Greenspan and leading Wall Street 
executives.  In a speech given in April 2005 Greenspan (2005) outlined how 
innovation had brought about a multitude of new products, speaking 
approvingly of how such “improvements” had led to a rapid growth in sub-
prime mortgage lending.4 
 
The net result of this mindset was the evolution of a largely unregulated parallel 
banking system performing the functions of banks but without being subject to 
banking regulations (Krugman 2008) which greatly contributed to the crisis. 
Turning to the extent of financial globalisation this paper follows Wolf 2007 in 
reporting the following main features: 
 
1. The McKinsey Global Institute data indicate that the ratio of global 
financial assets to annual world output increased from 109% in 1980 
to 316% in 2005. 
2. Wolf (2007) also notes that the nature of financing has changed.  In 
1980 bank deposits made up 42% of all financial securities. By 2005, 
this had fallen to 27 per cent. The capital markets increasingly 
perform the intermediation functions of the banking system. The 
latter, in turn, has shifted from commercial banking, with its long-
term lending to clients and durable relations with customers, towards 
investment banking. 
3. The capital markets increasingly perform the intermediation 
functions of the banking system. 
4. The increase in financial depth has been particularly marked in the 
Eurozone: the ratio of financial assets to gross domestic product there 
jumped from 180 per cent in 1995 to 303 per cent in 2005. Over the 
same period it grew from 278 per cent to 359 per cent in the UK and 
from 303 per cent to 405 per cent in the US. 
5. There has been widespread financial innovation which has brought to 







6. As a consequence of financial globalisation the inter-connectedness 
between banks and other financial institutions in different countries 
greatly increased.  At an early stage, observers noted, for example, 
the surprisingly large exposure of regional German banks to US 
subprime loans. 
7. The extent of globalization of finance is further indicated by the fact 
that foreign claims by banks from 5 major advanced countries rose 
from $6.3 trillion in 2000 to $22 trillion in June 2008.  There are 
many players in the markets notably the hedge funds and private 
equity funds. 
8. Another indicator of the extent of the financial globalization is the 
fact that the international financial assets and liabilities owned (and 
owed) by residents of high-income countries jumped from 50 per 
cent of aggregate GDP in 1970 to 100 per cent in the mid-1980s and 
about 330 per cent in 2004.  
9. In more historical terms, Wolf suggests that we are witnessing much 
of the transformation of mid-20th century managerial capitalism into 
global financial capitalism. 
 
How various aspects of financial globalisation contributed to the current 
international global economic crisis is now well understood and is well 
summarised by Blanchard in a series of contributions published by the IMF.  
See for example Blanchard 2008 and 2009.  He describes how the initial 
conditions on the eve of the crisis transformed the relatively small subprime 
mortgage losses from the fall in housing prices in the US into much bigger 
losses through the fall in share prices on the US stock market.  Moreover, as 
noted earlier, because of financial interconnectedness between countries these 
losses were further increased by declining share prices all over the world.  
 
4 THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION5 
 
The above is a cautionary tale of how under financial liberalisation, difficulties 
in one small market (eg. subprime market) through its interconnection with 
other markets may reduce global welfare.  Orthodox economics is nevertheless 
convinced about the economic efficiency of the global integration of financial 
markets. 
 
The case for international economic integration through capital account 
liberalisation in individual countries was authoritatively put forward by Stanley 
Fischer, the former deputy managing director of the IMF, in 1997.  Fischer 
suggested that, at a theoretical level, capital account liberalisation would lead to 
global economic efficiency, allocation of world savings to those who were able 
to use them most productively, and would thereby increase social welfare.  
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Citizens of countries with free capital movements would be able to diversify 
their portfolios and thereby increase their risk-adjusted rates of return.  It would 
enable corporations in these countries to raise capital in international markets at 
a lower cost.  It is suggested, moreover, that such liberalisation leads to further 
development of a country's financial system which in turn is thought to enhance 
productivity in the real economy by facilitating transactions and by better 
allocation of resources.  Some argue further that free capital movements will 
help increase world welfare through another channel, namely transferring 
resources from ageing populations and lower rates of return in advanced 
countries to younger populations and higher rates of return in newly 
industrialising economies.  Such resource transfers will be Pareto optimal as 
both rich and poor countries would gain.  
 
Summers (2000) succinctly sums up the core point of the orthodox perspective 
as follows: "… the abstract argument for a competitive financial system 
parallels the argument for competitive markets in general … Just as trade in 
goods across jurisdictions has benefits, so too will intertemporal trade and trade 
that shares risks across jurisdictions have benefits."  
 
The theoretical case against the Fischer –Summers` view that unfettered capital 
movements are essential for maximising world economic welfare and that 
financial liberalisation is analogous to trade liberalisation has been made by a 
number of economists from different schools of thought.  First within the 
neoclassical tradition itself, Stiglitz (2000) argues that the concept of free 
movements of capital is fundamentally different from that of free trade in 
goods.  Capital flows are subject to asymmetric information, agency problems, 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  Although such problems may occur also in 
trade in goods and services, they are intrinsic to financial flows and are far more 
important.  
 
Significantly, there are also diverging views about the price formation process 
in asset markets such as the stock market and the currency markets.  Orthodox 
economists subscribe to the theory of efficient markets.  In this view, prices are 
a collective outcome of actions of a multitude of individual economic agents 
whose behaviour is assumed to be based on utility maximisation and rational 
expectations.  This price formation process is thought to lead to efficient prices 
in these markets.  A powerful counter-view is that put forward by John Maynard 
Keynes (1936) in chapter 12 of the General Theory and which is encapsulated 
in his well-known "beauty contest" analogy which highlights the role of 
speculation in determining prices.  
 
Thus, in Keynesian analysis, which has been formalised in recent theoretical 
contributions, price formation in asset markets may often be dominated by 
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speculators or noise traders in modern parlance.  Moreover, theoretical work on 
Darwinian selection mechanisms indicates that the classic Friedman (1953) 
assertion that rational investors will always wipe out speculators is far from 
being valid in all situations.6
  
 
Further the critical school emphasises that financial markets are particularly 
prone to co-ordination failures and often generate multiple equilibria, some 
good, some bad.  In the absence of appropriate coordination by the government 
or international authorities, an economy may languish in a low level 
equilibrium, producing sub-optimal output and employment levels. 
 
In contrast, the case for free trade in goods is far more robust. Chakravarty and 
Singh (1988) suggest such a case for free trade is best put in terms of the two 
fundamental theorems of welfare economics.  According to the first welfare 
theorem, a competitive equilibrium in the absence of externalities and non-
satiation constitutes a Pareto optimum.  The second theorem, which is more 
relevant for our purposes, states that any Pareto optimum can be realised as a 
competitive equilibrium in the presence of all-around convexity, provided 
suitable lump-sum transfers can be arranged among the participants.  These are 
demanding assumptions and are not easily met in the real world.  Nevertheless, 
neo-classical economists suggest that such considerations do not destroy the 
case for trade openness but only change the nature of the argument.  Thus 
Krugman (1987) concludes his classic defence of free trade in terms of modern 
theory as follows: "this is not the argument that free trade is optimal because 
markets are efficient.  Instead it is a sadder but wiser argument for free trade as 
a rule of thumb in a world whose polities are as imperfect as its markets."  
As suggested by Chakravarty and Singh (1988), there is, however, a more 
robust economic case for a managed trade openness (rather than free trade) 
which would explicitly take into account increasing returns to scale and 
imperfect competition.  It would also stress the role of learning through 
economic interactions with the rest of the world.  However, it would need to 
assume that the level of aggregate demand in the world and national economies 
was adequate to provide continuous full utilisation of resources and full 
employment.  Within this kind of setting, managed trade openness can be a 
source of great advantage for an economy for any one of the following reasons:  
 
(a)  it may enable a country to concentrate its relatively specialised resources 
in areas of production where the world demand is highly income and 
price elastic;  
(b)  it may lead to diffusion of knowledge of a nature which can lead to 
considerable upgradation of the quality of local factors of production;  
(c)  it may lead to sufficient competitive pressure to eliminate X-inefficiency;  
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(d)  trade may lead to changes in the distribution of income which can lead to 
a greater share of accumulation in national income;  
(e)  trade may facilitate what Schumpeter stressed so much: an accelerated 
process of creative destruction.  
 
In general, trade openness works positively if the phenomenon of "learning" 
from contacts with the rest of the world are institutionalised through suitable 
adaptations on the supply side involving appropriate government interventions 
which make the domestic economy more responsive to change.  This is a main 
lesson that emerges from the outstanding industrial success of East Asian 
economies during the second half of the 20th Century.7 
 
To sum up, there is thus substance in Jagdish Bhagwati’s allegation that 
financial globalisation is favoured by Wall Street and the U.S. Treasury in order 
not to promote global welfare but for other less worthy motives i.e. keep 
financial control over developing countries.  Bhagwati would prefer developing 
countries to adopt trade globalisation and not worry about financial 
globalisation when they have reached a high level of economic and financial 
development.  This view is however, to some extent, negated by the fact that 
most developing countries have not abandoned financial globalisation but 
instead have tried to adapt to it.  
 
There is, however, an important point which Keynes has made with respect to 
the relationship between trade and financial globalisation which deserves 
attention.  Skidelsky (2011) states that according to Keynes unless the 
international monetary system is fixed, free trade will languish and globalisation 
will go into reverse.  Skidelsky observes there are signs that this is now 
happening – in the congressional demand in the US to impose trade sanctions 
on currency manipulators and in proposals for the regional lender of last resort. 
 
5. FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION AND THE REAL WORLD   
ECONOMY 
 
In this section, we consider the effects of financial globalisation in all its aspects 
on the real world economy.  We consider the interval 2000-2007, the period 
before the 2008-2010 global economic and financial crisis (which is normally 
regarded as starting from the bankruptcy of the Lehmann Brothers in September 
2008).  We ask the question, did globalisation of finance considered in 
comprehensive terms have a positive or negative effect on the international 




The world economy had the fastest growth rate ever during 2005-2007.  The 
world economy expanded at an unprecedented rate of more than 5% per annum 
in purchasing power parity terms.  It is also significant that developing countries 
grew faster than developed countries. India and China had stellar performances, 
recording growth rate of near 10%.  The number of people living in absolute 
poverty declined by a wide margin.  
 
The question arises whether this outstanding performance of the world economy 
can be ascribed to globalisation or attributed to other factors.  Some economists 
argue that globalisation had little to do with this outstanding performance.  
However, there are opposite arguments. China’s phenomenal success was due to 
export-led growth, where clearly China’s membership of the WTO allowed the 
country to have a very high rate of growth of manufactured-exports which led to 
its outstanding success.  There are, however, other factors which were also 
important. Financial globalisation allowed countries like the US and UK, which 
were running current account deficits to grow at a fast rate.  This in turn 
hastened the speed of growth of the world economy.  It is nevertheless also true 
to say that countries like China and India were able to grow fast because they 
did not abolish all their controls and in particular, regulated the foreign capital 
flows so as to maximise the national gain.  Nevertheless, between 2000 and 
2007 the world operated as close to a free-trade and free-capital movements 
regime as was feasible – it was not that different from the regime before the 
First World War. 
 
It is clear that without the fast growth of the world economy, developing 
countries would not have been able to grow at the rate they did.  The emphasis 
on stability in the post-crisis reform of the international system is therefore 
somewhat unfortunate for developing countries.  It is arguable that stability is 
more in the interest of the developed countries, while fast growth is of greater 
benefit to developing countries in order to reduce poverty and increase the 
living standards of people8. 
 
Singh and Zammit (2010) noted that the financial system and the conduct of 
monetary policy prior to the eruption of the financial crisis and onset of 
economic recession in 2008 have received thoroughly deserved criticism for 
allowing the development of the subprime mortgage bubble, the stock-market 
bubble and asset prices bubbles and not puncturing these in time or minimizing 
the damage.  There were however important benefits from this regime for the 
real economy as seen above.  It is important to have a balanced picture of merits 




6 MANAGERIAL vs FINANCE CAPITALISM 
 
Financial globalisation does not just affect financial variables at the national 
macroeconomic and at international levels so far discussed in this essay, but it 
also has profound effects at the micro-economic as well as mesa-economic 
levels in individual countries.  It has already led to major changes in economic 
regimes particularly in advanced countries.  These profound developments have 
been best summed up by Wolf (2007) when he suggests that the economic 
environment in the free market industrial countries such as the US and the UK 
has changed from managerial to finance capitalism during the second half of the 
twentieth century.  
 
In economic terms, this evolution of the economic regime has been associated 
with the emergence of a market for corporate control.  The latter in turn has 
imposed on corporate managers the goal of share-holder wealth maximisation, 
subject to a take-overs constraint on the stock-market.  Financial globalisation 
has thus been associated with the increased power of share-holders, the greater 
influence of institutional investors on the corporations, and widespread 
adoption, indeed an internalization by corporate managers of the goal of 
shareholder wealth maximisation.  Over time, the managers’ own interests have 
come to coincide with that of share owners, not least because of the stock 
options which have come to dominate the managerial remuneration packages.  
Finance capitalism in this form is spreading throughout the world at greater or 
slower speeds.  
 
The question arises whether the increasing role of stock markets, the influence 
of the market for corporate control and financial innovations of the last two 
decades are in the best interests of developing countries in their quest for fast 
industrialisation.  Evidence on these issues is not reassuring from a developing 
country perspective.  Both analyses and evidence suggest that the enhanced role 
of stock market in an economy leads to short-termism and a preference for 
quick profits at the expense of longer term investment, see Singh (1997) and 
Deakin and Singh (2009). An important reason for this negative effects of 
financial globalisation lies in the short-comings of both the pricing and takeover 
mechanisms on the stock market.  These two mechanisms are the key channels 
through which the stock market influences economic outcomes. Each of these 
will be briefly commenting upon below. 
 
Taking the takeover mechanism first, a vast body of research indicates that the 
market for corporate control, although it has a potential for the firm level as 
well as global economic efficiency, it does not in fact achieve those objectives.  
There are in principle two ways in which the takeover mechanism can lead to 
greater efficiency.  The first is through the threat of takeover which can 
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discipline less efficient firms.  The second is that social value may be added 
even if all firms are operating at their highest level of efficiency. Amalgamation 
of some of these firms may lead to greater value through synergy than otherwise 
would be the case. 
Unfortunately, however, neither of these mechanisms works very well in 
practice.  Empirical results from a half century of research indicate that 
although selection in the market for corporate control takes place in part on the 
basis of performance (i.e. shareholder value) it also takes place to a large extent 
on the basis of size9.  Thus, a small profitable firm has a greater chance of being 
acquired than a large relatively unprofitable one10.  
 
Since third world firms are likely to be small compared with those from 
advanced countries, in a free market for corporate control, the smaller firms are 
likely to be at a disadvantage. In practical terms this means that if there was 
complete capital account liberalisation the small often more efficient and 
technologically progressive domestic firms will be subject to takeover by the 
larger and relatively less efficient advanced country firms.  This is one of the 
reasons why developing countries should have the power to impose capital 
controls, importantly including against FDI. In orthodox analysis FDI is 
regarded as being sacrosanct but research shows that under globalisation it has 
also been subject to enormous fluctuations and is likely to generate financial 
fragility almost as much as other types of capital flows (see Singh 2005 and 
IMF 2011 a and b). These countries should therefore vigorously oppose the so-
called multilateral agreement on investment.  
 
This agreement was proposed by advanced countries at the WTO. It would give 
multinationals complete freedom to invest where they like, when they like and 
in what they like.  Such globalisation is clearly not in the interests of developing 
countries and was therefore duly opposed. However although the proposal was 
effectively defeated, it is still on the table (see further Singh (2005). 
 
Having examined the many deficiencies of the market for corporate control, we 
will now turn briefly to the pricing mechanism on the stock market. This suffers 
from its own deficits including frequent and prolonged mispricing of shares. 
The traditional efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) as a description of stock 
market share prices has been subject to important criticisms. During the last two 
decades the EMH has been thought to be incompatible with a number of events 
in the real world stock markets, a) the US stock market crash in 1987, b) the 
melt-down in the Asian stock markets in the late 1990s, c) the technology 
bubble in the US in 2000, d) the virtual melt-down of the US stock market in 
the wake of the difficulties of subprime mortgages market during the current 
global financial crisis. As Alan Greenspan observed with respect to the 1987 US 




“The US experienced such a sudden change with the decline in stock 
prices of more than 20 per cent on October 19, 1987. There is no credible 
scenario that can readily explain so abrupt a change in the fundamentals of 
long-term valuations on that one day”.   
 
Tobin (1984) made an analytically useful distinction between two kinds of 
efficiency of stock markets, (a) the information arbitrage efficiency that ensures 
that all information concerning a firm’s shares immediately percolates to all 
stock market participants, ensuring that no participant can make a profit on such 
public information; (b) fundamental valuation efficiency, that is, share prices 
accurately reflect a firm’s fundamentals, namely the long-term expected 
profitability. The growing consensus view is that, in these terms, stock markets 
may at best be regarded as being efficient in the sense of (a) but far from being 
efficient in the economically more important sense (b). Thus EMH, as identified 
in a, is compatible with share prices not reflecting fundamental values.   
 
In addition to the deficiencies of the takeover mechanism and the basic pricing 
process on the stock market, the rise of finance capitalism can in a general sense 
result in the unhealthy ascendancy of finance over production. Similarly finance 
capitalism leads up financial engineering taking precedence over the normal 
long run entrepreneur tasks of introducing technical change, reducing costs and 
improving products. The operation of stock markets particularly the market for 
corporate control also has adverse consequences for income and wealth 
distribution. Huge fortunes are made and lost on the stock market and on the 
market for corporate control. Managerial stock options are an important source 
of economic inequality.   
7 IMF’s NEW DOCTRINE ON CAPITAL CONTROLS 
 
After a long protracted struggle with independent economists and third world 
policy makers, the IMF has finally accepted that free-flow of capital in many 
circumstances can damage developing countries (IMF 2011 a and b)11. 
Moreover IMF accepted that there are cases where the adoption of capital 
controls by developing countries has resulted in improved economic 
performance. While conceding the case for the capital controls, the institution 
has sought to limit the kind of controls which it thinks are appropriate for 
developing countries in different states of the world. The IMF also suggests 
extreme caution in relation to the period for which capital controls are imposed 
– they should be removed as quickly as possible. 
 
The IMF’s new doctrine on capital flows and capital controls should be 
welcomed but it must be recognised that there is a long way to go before a fully 
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satisfactory policy regime emerges in this area. It will be recalled that in the 
pre-Second World War period, the League of Nations economists (eg. Nurkse, 
1944) had argued on the basis of experience of smaller European countries that 
the free capital flows are not in the best interests of these countries. This was the 
reason why in the IMF articles of agreement negotiated at Bretton Woods, there 
was a strong injunction against countries promoting free capital flows. In the 
original agreements it was the free capital flows rather than the capital controls 
which were frowned upon. However the IMF throughout much of the post – 
Second World War period did quite the opposite encouraging countries to 
liberalise their financial markets. Ultimately in 1997 at the Hong Kong meeting 
of the IMF, the institution’s staff proposed that the Fund should have one of its 
principle duties to establish free capital movements in all countries in an orderly 
fashion. As the Asian crisis intervened this proposal was quietly shelved. 
 
Developing countries are not satisfied with the present extent of change in the 
Fund’s position embodied in the institution’s new doctrine. Developing 
countries would like the Fund to go further and help them with designing capital 
controls on a multilateral basis which will stem harmful and volatile capital 
flows. Although it is early days, at the very least this evolution of events 
suggests a large dis-satisfaction among developing countries about financial 
globalisation. Any greater dis-satisfaction runs the risk of the rejection of the 
entire doctrine of free capital flows. This would effectively stop the financial 
globalisation process as it happened in 1930s. However, as argued in this paper, 
that will be a mistake from the perspective of developing countries themselves. 
Regulated capital flows are much better than no capital flow at all. 
 
8 FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
As noted in the introduction, one of the remits for this paper has been the 
instruction to examine the relationship between financial globalisation and 
human development.  This is an exceptionally difficult task because as far as I 
am aware there are no direct studies of human development and financial 
globalisation.  Therefore, one has to use the best available surrogates for these 
variables in order to acquire some understanding of the issues involved. 
 
There are a number of studies which examine the relationship between financial 
liberalisation and poverty.  If poverty reduction is taken as an index of the 
improvement in human development – which is by no means far-fetched – then 
a number of studies can be cited.  The main players in these analyses have 
included the IMF and Joseph Stiglitz.  The IMF and its staff have tended to 
produce results indicating that financial liberalisation or more precisely, capital 
account liberalisation benefits the poor and reduces poverty.  To illustrate, an 
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IMF Board document by Prasad et al (2003) suggested that capital account 
liberalisation increases economic growth. This is achieved through high 
investment resulting from higher returns to capital flows, through increased 
efficiency via transfer of technology and managerial know-how, and by the 
introduction of organisational changes in finance and banking.  All these may 
be expected to follow in the wake of capital account liberalisation, which in turn 
reduce poverty.  The literature also mentions the disciplinary effects of 
liberalisation on governments which are obliged to pursue better 
macroeconomic policies. This line of analyses has been severely criticised by 
Stiglitz (2004) who concluded by suggesting: 
 
“The IMF should change from pressuring countries into liberalising their capital 
markets into working with countries on how to design interventions in the 
capital markets which stabilize capital flows, or even better, ensure that they 
move counter-cyclically. It should be working harder to address the underlying 
failures in capital markets, devising ways by which more of the risk of interest-
rate and exchange-rate fluctuations can be shifted to developed countries and 
international financial institutions. And, in the future, it should rely more on 
evidence and less on ideology in developing its policy agenda” (Stiglitz 2004, 
pages 65-66) 
 
Overall it is fair to say that the results of the empirical studies on capital account 
liberalisation and economic growth are mixed and inconclusive. The research 
findings are however, more clear cut on the question of the effects of financial 
liberalisation on fluctuations in economic activity.  These fluctuations are 
harmful to poor people and particularly, to women.  As Singh and Zammit 
(2000) pointed out, economic recessions increase the unpaid work of women, 
while their remuneration from and the quantity of paid work declined.  On the 
question of income inequality, Cornia (2004) suggests that capital account 
liberalisation has the strongest impact on widening inequality within individual 
countries.  Cornia also suggests that further domestic financial liberalisation has 
a negative effect on the poor.   
 
In the same vein, Mah-Hui and Chin (2010) report that in the US between 1993 
and 2006, the top one per cent income earners captured half of the overall 
economic growth. In terms of wealth distribution, the top 1 per cent of 
households owned 33 per cent of the total wealth in 2001, twice the amount 
owed by the bottom 80 per cent. They reckon that economic inequality gives 
rise to two kinds of bubbles – a debt bubble assumed by households whose 
incomes have stagnated and whose consumption can only be met through taking 
on more debt; and an asset price bubble that is the consequence of the rich 
chasing the higher yields. It is not surprising that despite the greater economic 
efficiency which capital account liberalisation may entail, income distribution 
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may worsen because the efficiency benefits of well-functioning capital markets 
go to the rich rather than the poor in many developing countries. 
In order for human development to improve, it is necessary for the government 
to intervene through creation of public services to improve citizens’ health, 
education and other indicators of human development. This of course requires 
increased government revenues which economic growth can provide but that is 
not a sufficient condition for improving human development. It may not even be 
a necessary one.  In view of the fact that financial globalisation does not have an 
unambiguous effect on economic growth, one need not pursue this avenue any 
further.  
 
Another study which requires discussion here is that by Arestis and Caner 
(2010). This is one of the econometrically more sophisticated studies on the 
subject. It pays careful attention to causation, to the data (they only use data 
from the developing countries) and notably, the authors directly relate capital 
account liberalisation to poverty without going through the intermediate steps of 
exploring the relationship between capital account liberalisation and growth and 
subsequently that of growth and poverty. In econometric terms, their direct 
approach to this question in the context of the literature on the subject is 
invaluable. Arestis and Caner’s results may be summarised as follows. Firstly, 
they find no statistically significant relationship between the degree of capital 
account liberalisation during the period and the poverty rate.  Secondly, they 
also find developing countries with higher institutional quality have lower 
poverty rates, but the effect has low statistical significance.  Thirdly, they find a 
higher degree of capital account liberalisation results in a lower income share 
for the poor. 
 
To sum up, if reduction in poverty is taken as a surrogate for improvement in 
human development, then the balance of evidence cited in this section on the 
basis of partial studies, suggests that financial globalisation does not enhance 
human development. However, this result needs to be assessed also in the light 
of the earlier discussion which suggested that financial globalisation led to fast 
world economic growth and generated sizeable reduction in poverty in low-
income developing countries such as India and China. Thus, the overall 
conclusion is that financial globalisation is a powerful force which can both 
help or hinder human development. It is best likely to help human development 
(i.e. reduce poverty) if there is a high rate of growth of world demand and fast 
growth of world economy, it will also help if the governments use appropriate 
policy measures to improve income distribution and to promote employment.  
High unemployment, particularly youth unemployment constitute some of the 
greatest challenges facing the vast majority of developing countries. ILO (2011) 
rightly notes that the governments can take steps to simultaneously improve 
income distribution and employment. One of the important stylised facts about 
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the world economy today is that the share of labour in national income has 
declined sizeably and that of capital has increased in most economies 
throughout the world. ILO rightly argues that if this was put right and the share 
of labour was increased, this would increase world demand and hence, 
employment. These and similar ideas need careful attention from developing 
countries themselves but equally importantly from international organisations 
concerned with development. 
 
Financial globalisation has allowed developing countries to take a giant step 
forward in the last 10 years by its positive impact on world demand and growth. 
Developing countries need to build on this in cooperation with other countries 
by pursuing co-ordinated economic expansion at a global level while at the 
same time reducing the negative effects of finance capitalism at the micro-and 






1  Unless the context indicates otherwise the words financial liberalisation and 
financial globalisation have been used interchangeably throughout the paper 
2   For  differing views of the crisis from mainstream and heterodox economists, 
see the following: Aiginger (2009), Arestis and Singh (2010), Cambridge 
Journal of Economics (2009 and 2010), Campbell (2011), Eatwell and Mill 
Gate (2011), IMF (2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2010a, 2010b), 
Krugman (2008, 2010), Ormerod (2010), Palma (2009), Solow (2009), Taylor 
2010, UNCTAD (2008, 2009, 2010), UNDESA (2008, 2009, 2010), the US 
Council of Economic Advisers (2010). 
 
3  The following facts are based on Wolf  (2007) 
 
4  The New York Times, reporting on Greenspan’s evidence before a 2008 
Congressional Committee, wrote,  ‘…Mr Greenspan conceded error on 
regulation, stating that he had “put too much faith” in the self-correcting powers 
of free markets. . .refused to accept blame for the crisis but acknowledged that 
his belief in deregulation had been shaken”.  (Andrews 2008).  In testifying 
before the 2010 US Congress Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee (established 
to investigate the sub-prime mortgage crisis) Greenspan defended himself 
against the dual charge that he was responsible for (a) the housing bubble due to 
his low interest rate policy and for (b) not puncturing the bubble before it 
reached a level that would cause serious systemic difficulties.  Greenspan 
suggested that his critics had short memories as many of them had earlier 
applauded sub-prime mortgages as being of tremendous benefit to low-income 
Americans.  Furthermore, he suggested that a t the time many people would 
have questioned whether there was indeed a housing bubble and asked how, in 
any case, the Federal Reserve would know the answer to this question better 
than the market.  He also told the committee that regulators were helpless to 
stop the economic meltdown and the sub-prime mortgage crisis (Greenspan, 
2010). 
5  The analysis of this section draws on and updates my paper Singh 2002 
 
6   On this set of issues, see for example, Stiglitz (1994); Allen and Gale (2000); 
Glen, Lee and Singh (2000). 
 




8  The experience of Latin American countries in the 1990s indicated that 
although many of them achieved stability in the sense of low rate of inflation; 
they were unable to attain fast growth. 
 
9  There is a huge literature on the subject.  The classic references are Singh 
(1975, 1992, 1998), Jensen (1988) Scherer (1998), and Mueller (2003).  The 
more recent literature is summed up by Cosh and Hughes (2008), Tichy (2002), 
Gugler et al (2004), and Scherer (2006).  
 
10  The other mechanism, by which mergers can benefit society, is through the 
act of merger itself as outlined in the text.  Overall empirical evidence on this 
channel is not very helpful either from the perspective of those who emphasise 
the virtues of the market for corporate control.  Both studies based on 
accounting data as well as stock market data have been examined in detail in a 
large literature and the consensus is that mergers do not lead to greater 
efficiency through this route.  See further Mueller (2003), Scherer (2006), Tichy 
(2002), and Deakin and Singh (2009). 
 
11  See for example, the controversy between Professor Stiglitz and the IMF in 
the next section. 
 
12  How this coordination can be achieved is discussed in detail in Izurieta and 
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